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Housing and public schooling are important topics in public economics, and there may be a strong relationship between them. Proponents of school levy passage often argue that the protection of property values is a primary reason to vote for additional school funding. Battles over the appropriate amount of funding rage between direct users of public schooling and nonusers; furthermore, there is disagreement over how much should be spent on education even among parents who enroll their children in public school. Because housing and public schooling are important goods, it is important to investigate (1) the relationship between house price and school quality and (2) the determinants of the demand for public school quality.
The estimation results in this study suggest that public school quality and house prices are consistently and positively related. In fact, house price is more responsive to changes in school quality than to changes in any other community characteristic.
Previous research measures the price of a unit of public schooling with either taxes or the implicit price calculated from a house price hedonic. This study uses both price measures. The tax price and the implicit price both seem to serve as good price measures, and each measure captures a different kind of price. They are not duplicative. The estimated tax price elasticity of the demand for public schooling is -.17; the implicit price elasticity is -.11.
1 Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) reported that most such elasticities range from -.20 to -.40, and Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982, 1199 ) reported a range of -.25 to -.50. So it seems the -.17 and -.11 estimates are more inelastic than the elasticities typically reported.
The relatively inelastic results of this study are not due to the inclusion of both the tax price and implicit price. Excluding either price variable does not affect the other's parameter estimate. Also, changing the estimation techniques to ordinary least squares makes the estimates slightly more inelastic: Tax price elasticity goes from -.17 to -.12, and the implicit price elasticity goes from -.11 to -.05. Changing the measure of school quality to expenditure per pupil also makes the price elasticities less negative. 2 So the cause of the relatively inelastic price estimates remains undetermined. It may stem from the geographic coverage: The current demand estimates are based on the 135 suburban school districts of the six largest metropolitan areas in the state of Ohio in 1990.
The demand for public schooling is significantly related to community education levels, income levels, and marital status. The income elasticity of demand for public schooling is .32.
This article first constructs a hedonic house price equation. From the hedonic regression results, the implicit price of school quality is calculated. The implicit price is then used in estimations of the demand for public school quality.
THE HEDONIC HOUSE PRICE METHOD
The study first estimates a hedonic house price equation. The hedonic estimation will shed light on the relationship between public school quality and house prices. The hedonic estimation is also a necessary step for the demand estimation. Demand functions contain the price of the good. Because there is no explicit market for public school quality, there is no readily observed explicit price of a unit of public schooling. The hedonic technique can find the implicit price of public schooling by seeing how strongly it is valued in the housing market.
The theory behind the hedonic technique is generally credited to Sherwin Rosen (1974) . Using the hedonic method, house price is estimated as a function of many characteristics. These characteristics include house attributes such as the number of rooms and the square footage of the house and the yard. Other, less tangible attributes also affect house price, including public school quality. The partial derivative of house price with respect to public school quality yields the implicit price of school quality. Rosen recommended using the implicit price to estimate a demand function.
The main shortcoming of Rosen's (1974) method is that the estimated implicit price may not provide any information beyond what the original hedonic provided. The only new information is the functional form restriction placed on the demand equation. If there is no new information, the coefficients of the demand equation can be derived from the initial hedonic (Tinbergen 1956; Brown and Rosen 1982) . The demand cannot be identified from the hedonic. Various identification strategies are available: (1) If the true functional form of the demand estimation were known, identification would be achieved; (2) if certain housing characteristics were known to not affect the demand estimation, it might be possible to achieve identification; (3) a homothetic functional form for utility could be assumed (Quigley 1982) . But there is no way to know whether these assumptions correspond to the truth about utility functions or the demand equation.
Instead, the identification strategy of spatially segmented markets does not rely on additional assumptions about utility functions or the demand equation (Brown and Rosen 1982; Palmquist 1984; Witte, Sumka, and Erekson 1979) . A separate hedonic house price function is estimated for each of the six major metropolitan areas in Ohio: Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo. Estimating each metro area separately will generate six different coefficients for the relationship between school quality and house price. The data are then pooled when estimating the demand equation. Because the implicit prices are based on multiple school quality parameter estimates, it is no longer possible to derive the coefficients of the demand function from the initial hedonic, thus solving the identification problem. Or, more basically, to trace out a demand curve, at least two points are needed where different supply curves hit the same demand curve. Having variation across the metropolitan areas provides these points.
How can a researcher theoretically justify using a separate hedonic for each metropolitan area? Palmquist (1984) assumed that there is no segmentation within a metro area but that there is segmentation between them because of moving costs; however, moving between suburbs of a single metro area costs nearly as much as moving between metro areas. So instead, this author reasoned that there is market segmentation between metro areas but not within a metro area because of job availability. It is relatively easy to commute to the workplace from anywhere in the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA). It is more difficult to commute to the workplace from a different MSA. It is even more difficult in the short run to find a job in a new metro area, move to that new metro area, and then commute to work. A Chow test indicates that each of the six Ohio MSAs represents a segmented market (Kennedy 1992, 108) . In consequence, a separate hedonic is estimated for each metropolitan area.
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HEDONIC EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
Following Haurin and Brasington (1996) closely, the first step is to estimate a hedonic house price equation for each metro area. Consider the determinants of house value:
In Equation (1), v stands for the value of house i, the subscript j refers to school district (community) j, X represents structural house and land characteristics, and J is a dummy variable for each district. δ represents the percentage deviations of the value of an average house in district j from the value of a similar house in the reference district. δ essentially measures how much more or less the same house would cost if it were picked up and set down in another school district. To deter-166 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW mine why the constant-quality house commands a different price, the second step of the estimation takes the premium of each district and explains it as a function of community-level variables:
In (2), Z is a vector of community-level variables. Equation (2) tests whether community-level variables are capitalized into house price.
Equations (1) and (2) Regressing (1) and (2) as they are causes a problem: The dependent variable in the second equation is a parameter estimate from the first. Each estimate has a standard error, and the estimates are also correlated. The generated regressor problem is addressed in the following manner. First, regress
to find root mean square error (RMSE) from the above regression, then square it. 5 Call the resulting product σ 2 , the estimated variance of µ in Equation (2), above.
Also, from the regression of Equation (3), save the vector of parameter estimates δ and perform the regression indicated in Equation (2) . From this regression, find RMSE, square it, and call it τ 2 , the estimated variance of ε in Equation (1), above. Use σ 2 and τ 2 to create the following weight:
Next, substitute Equation (2) into (1) to create (5):
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Assuming the errors in (1) and (2) are uncorrelated, Equation (5) may be estimated using the weight in Equation (4). Having solved the generated regressor problem, the parameter estimates from Equation (5) will be consistent and asymptotically efficient.
CHOICE OF HEDONIC VARIABLES
The house characteristics X ij used are square feet of lot, age of the house, a deck dummy, a pool dummy, a garage dummy, a fireplace dummy, the number of full bathrooms, the number of partial bathrooms, an air conditioning dummy, dummies for the quarter of sale, and the total number of rooms in the house. The number of rooms is a measure of house size. The squares of age, lot size, and number of rooms are included because they may enter a house's value in a nonlinear fashion. The quarter of sale dummy is included to capture any seasonality in house prices.
The following community variables Z j may be capitalized into house value: the tax rate, distance from the central business district (CBD), the population growth rate of the community, the median income level in the community, and the percentage of non-White residents in the community. Local public economic theory suggests that taxes may be capitalized into house value. To avoid possible assessor bias, taxes are measured by the community's property tax rate (Yinger et al. 1988 ); all else constant, higher tax rates are expected to lower house value. Standard urban economic theory suggests that distance from the CBD influences house value. In the standard urban model, households all work downtown and are expected to value proximity to the workplace to cut commuting costs. The house price appreciation literature implies that population growth affects house value (Archer, Gatzlaff, and Ling 1996) . The amenity literature inspires the income and racial composition variables. The percentage of non-White residents in a community is expected to depress house value, and higher community income is expected to boost house value.
One more community variable may be capitalized into house value: the quality of the local public school district. Economists have used many measures of school quality in hedonic house price models with 168 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW varying degrees of success. These measures include the pupil/teacher ratio (Harrison and Rubinfeld 1978; Grether and Mieszkowski 1974) , reading scores (Grether and Mieszkowski 1974) , a dummy variable for whether residents believe school quality is bad (Linneman 1980) , and expenditure per pupil (Edel and Sclar 1974; Gustely 1976 ). Rosen and Fullerton (1977) criticized the use of expenditures as proxies for the quantity or quality of public education. They claimed that it is not certain that output can be measured by the expenditure on inputs. Accordingly, they used student achievement scores of fourth graders in the subjects of reading and math as school quality measures. They found that using an output measure yields more theoretically consistent capitalization results than using an input measure. Most of the recent literature measures school quality with proficiency test scores (Goodman and Thibodeau 1998; Haurin and Brasington 1996; Walden 1990 ).
There is increased interest in the use of the value-added approach to measure school quality in hedonic estimations. Whereas proficiency tests capture the level of student performance, value added captures how much additional knowledge schools have taught their students. However, there is disagreement about how to calculate value added, 6 value added is not yet widely used in the hedonic literature, and there is evidence that value added is not consistently related to house price. For instance, Hayes and Taylor (1996) found that the value added of schooling is positively related to house prices in northern Dallas but not related to house prices in southern Dallas. Brasington (1999) ran 444 hedonic regressions comparing various school quality measures in house price hedonics. He found that the housing market values proficiency tests more consistently than value added.
School quality is measured by the percentage of students who pass the Ohio ninth-grade proficiency test administered in 1990. The average of the passage rates of the reading, writing, math, and citizenship sections is used.
7 They may not perfectly capture school quality, but proficiency test scores are visible to parents (Jud 1985) , avoid the sample selection bias of SAT scores (Hanushek and Taylor 1990) , 8 and are commonly used in the real estate and economics literatures.
Theory provides little guide for the proper functional form of a house price hedonic. A series of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) Brasington / THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 169 tests for functional form proved inconclusive as well. The semilog functional form is adopted because adjusted R-square is marginally higher when the dependent variable is logged. Also, note that the explanatory variables are measured at two different levels: the house level and the school district level. This causes no econometric problems; in particular, there is no need to adjust the standard errors of the school district-level parameter estimates. The only problem that might occur is that the school district variables may be less precisely estimated because they take fewer values (135) than the house variables (43,123).
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DATA
The primary source of data for the hedonic regression is a tape of housing purchases that occurred during 1991 in Ohio (Amerestate 1991) . The data are cleaned to eliminate all but single-family detached dwellings. To keep the sample urban, any house with lot size greater than two acres is suspected of being a farm and deleted. Houses that transact at prices higher than $400,000 are deleted for being unrepresentative, and houses that transact for less than $10,000 are deleted for suspicion of being either uninhabitable or a gift between family members. In addition, outliers in square feet of housing and garage size are deleted. Any district with less than 17 observations is deleted for fear of not producing a reliable estimation given that there are jurisdictional dummy variables. The final sample contains 43,123 houses in 135 communities, and the mean deflated house value is $72,829.
10 The School District Data Book (MESA Group 1994) and the Ohio Department of Education (1999) provide the explanatory variables. Table 1  contains variable means, and Table 2 shows definitions and data sources. Table 3 shows the results of the six hedonic regressions. The hedonic results in Table 3 are almost exactly as expected for house 170 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW characteristics; the community characteristics also conform well with expectations. Distance is always negative and significant. Community income is a positive significant determinant of the variation in house Brasington / THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 171 The focus variable, LOG PROFICIENCY TEST SCORE, is positive and significant in every hedonic. Toledo has the highest parameter estimate: .39. Cincinnati and Dayton have the lowest: .11. Because the range of parameter estimates is large, it seems that the parameter estimates vary enough to identify the supply equation from the hedonics. Two formal tests also suggest that the parameter estimates vary across housing markets.
HEDONIC HOUSE PRICE REGRESSION RESULTS
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CALCULATING THE IMPLICIT PRICES
The results of the hedonic regressions are now used to calculate the implicit price of public school quality. From the 44,123 individual housing sales, one implicit price of school quality is calculated for each of the 135 school districts. There are 17 school districts in the Akron MSA, 17 in Dayton, 48 in Cleveland, 10 in Toledo, 18 in Columbus, and 25 in Cincinnati.
The implicit price is the partial derivative of house price with respect to the characteristic in question. A portion of the estimation relationship is shown below:
LOG HOUSE PRICE = δ 1 LOG PROFICIENCY TEST SCORE.
The implicit price of public school quality is ∂HOUSE PRICE/∂PROFICIENCY TEST SCORE = (δ 1 *HOUSE PRICE)/PROFICIENCY TEST SCORE.
To arrive at a single implicit price of public school quality for each school district, find the median voter's house price in the school district. Multiply the median house price by the MSA's public school quality parameter estimate. Then divide by the proficiency test score. Apply the same procedure to every school district in every metro area; each of the resulting mathematical products is an implicit price of public school quality. An example may help. Madeira City School District is one of the Cincinnati MSA's school districts. To calculate the implicit price of 176 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW public school quality, take the median house price in Madeira and multiply it by .11, the parameter estimate of public school quality in the Cincinnati MSA's hedonic in Table 3 . Divide the product of the two numbers by Madeira's proficiency test score. The samplewide average implicit price of public school quality is 371, implying that an additional percentage point of proficiency test passage raises the price of the median house by $371. The implicit prices are additionally adjusted for the tax rate because the property tax affects the value of the capitalization of school quality into house prices: Homeowners in communities with high tax rates pay more property taxes and therefore receive lower capitalization benefits of school quality (Crane 1990 ). The tax-adjusted implicit prices of public school quality are now used to estimate the demand for public schooling.
TIEBOUT BIAS AND OTHER DEMAND ESTIMATION HAZARDS
There are many issues to address when estimating the demand for public school quality. Jud and Watts's (1981) study is one that derived the implicit price of school quality from a housing market hedonic. In so doing, the authors simply averaged the implicit prices of each household in a community to arrive at a single price measure for each community. This technique is not based on any theoretical justification. In contrast, the current study relies on the median voter model (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973) . The median voter is assumed to own the house of median value; the value of the median house in each community is used to calculate the implicit price.
The median voter approach is not free from criticism, though. Goldstein and Pauly (1981) discussed the potential drawbacks in some detail, with particular emphasis on its relation to the Tiebout hypothesis (Tiebout 1956 ). The Tiebout hypothesis describes how households sort themselves among communities that have different levels of taxation and public good provision. Each household moves to the community that meets its particular taste for local public goods. Goldstein and Pauly said that a problem arises because the median Brasington / THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODSvoter model assumes proportionality of desired service level in income. In reality, the proportionality of income assumption is violated because there is imperfect Tiebout sorting, and choosing a median voter on the basis of income will bias regression results. Goldstein and Pauly called this 'Tiebout bias.' They said the use of individual micro data will more likely produce unbiased parameter estimates.
However, Rubinfeld, Shapiro, and Roberts (1987) (RSR) pointed out that even if micro data are used, they are likely to suffer from the same Tiebout bias that Goldstein and Pauly (1981) said may occur when the median voter model is used. RSR suggested including sorting variables that will minimize the mismatch between actual and desired spending, thus reducing the magnitude of the error term and reducing omitted variable bias.
In addition, one assumption of the median voter framework is that voters have single-peaked preferences. In estimating the demand for public schooling, the presence of a private school alternative will violate this assumption. However, it is still appropriate to estimate a demand curve for public schooling because even if preferences are not single peaked, all voters have the same underlying demand for the service (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973) .
The issue of the proper measure of school quality in a hedonic house price regression has already been addressed; however, the appropriate measure of school quality in a demand estimation is an additional concern. The traditional dependent variable is expenditures per pupil. One such example is Rubinfeld's (1977) . However, Rosen and Fullerton (1977) argued that student test scores may better represent school outcomes than expenditures on an input to the education process in hedonic estimations. By the same logic, using a school output is probably more appropriate than using expenditures on inputs to measure the demand for school quality. Demand for schooling may be measured by proficiency test scores. Jud and Watts's (1981) study is one such precedent.
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Another demand estimation concern is functional form. A Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) test for functional form is inconclusive. Experimentation with the major functional forms shows that the most explanatory power comes from the semilog functional form.
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CHOICE OF VARIABLES FOR DEMAND EQUATION
The implicit price of public school quality calculated from the hedonics is used endogenously in the demand estimation. It is important to choose instruments that are uncorrelated with the dependent variable, LOG PROFICIENCY TEST SCORE. The following instrumental variables are chosen: density (correlation = -.28), an ease of commuting index (-.074), climate (.036), and the MSA growth rate (.018). In addition to being uncorrelated with the dependent variable, the instruments should be significantly correlated with the variable for which they serve as instruments. The instruments pass the Nelson and Startz (1990) test for irrelevant instruments: The calculated statistic of 68.9 exceeds the critical value of 2.
There is an additional price of education that belongs in the demand estimation: taxes. The implicit price of public schooling and the tax price are not duplicative; in fact, the correlation between them is only .15. The implicit price measures the capitalization price; a change in the implicit price is a movement along the demand curve. The tax price measures the tax effort required to achieve a certain amount of spending on public schooling. For a fixed amount of public school expenditure, a community with a lower overall tax base imposes a higher tax price on the median voter. A higher tax price may be associated with lower demand for school quality. A change in the tax price shifts the demand curve.
There are other differences between the implicit hedonic price and the tax price. The tax price is the share of the tax burden the median voter pays for the public service. The tax price depends on the tax rate and the price of the median voter's house-both of which the median voter chooses. On the other hand, the implicit capitalization price is not chosen. It is the price a resident would have to pay (is willing to pay) to get an extra unit of schooling. It is not chosen by a resident; instead, it reflects the equilibrium between the supply and demand for public schooling in a metropolitan area, as revealed through the housing market.
Also, the tax price depends on the amount of property value in the entire community; Equation (7) shows the implicit hedonic price only depends on the price of the median voter's house. So the tax price inBrasington / THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODScorporates the value of commercial and industrial property that the implicit price does not.
A final difference is that the implicit price depends on how strongly school quality is valued in the housing market. In contrast, the tax price is not related to school quality; it is only related to the cost of schooling provided; and the link between the quality and the cost of public schooling is tenuous at best (Hanushek 1997) .
In summary, the implicit price of education should be negatively related to the quantity of school quality demanded, just like price is negatively related to the quantity demanded for any typical commodity. An increase in the tax price should shift the demand for schooling to the left. Therefore, the implicit price of public school quality and the tax price are included in the demand for education regression. Previous studies, in contrast, use either the implicit price or taxes, but not both.
There is some question about the operation of taxes in the median voter framework. Because of the decisiveness of the median voter, the tax rate is not an exogenous variable and may depend on such things as exported tax (Downes and Pogue 1994) . The tax rate is used to calculate the tax price, so the tax price is treated as an endogenous variable in the demand estimation (Hite et al. 2001) . Taxes may be nonlinear in demand. A higher budget leads to capital migration, which in turn means a larger share of the budget must be borne by the median voter (Reiter and Weichenrieder 1997) . The tax price is therefore treated as a nonlinear and endogenous variable in the demand estimation. The instrumental variables are the same as those for the implicit price of schooling: density, an ease of commuting index, climate, and MSA growth rate. The instruments pass the Nelson and Startz (1990) Four demographic variables are hypothesized to influence the demand for public schooling. Median community income is expected to be positively related to the demand for public schooling. Education levels of the community are also expected to be related to school quality demand. Communities with lower average education levels are expected to demand less public schooling. The proportions of community residents who have (1) no high school diploma and (2) only a high school diploma are expected to be negatively related to the demand for schooling. Marital status may also influence public school quality demand. The larger the proportion of single persons in the community, the lower public school quality demand should be.
Two RSR sorting variables are included to help mitigate Tiebout bias. A central-city dummy variable is chosen to represent a lack of choice among public good bundles. The proportion of residents who have lived in the community for less than 6 years is chosen to represent newcomers. Because newcomers have moved in recently, the level of public services provided is probably similar to the level that induced the residents to move to the community (Tiebout 1956 ).
The means of the variables used in the demand estimation are presented in Table 1 . Definitions and sources are found in Table 2 .
DEMAND FOR EDUCATION RESULTS
The first set of two-stage least squares demand results in Table 4 is the baseline regression. The results show the implicit price of public education is negatively related to the quantity demanded. The price elasticity of demand is -.11. The tax price is also negatively related to demand; its elasticity is -.17. The price and tax elasticities in the current study are slightly more inelastic than the -.20 to -.40 range reported in most studies (Reiter and Weichenrieder 1997) . Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982) found a tax elasticity that ranged from -.57 to -.39. Next, the sorting variables appear. No strong interpretation should be given to these variables because their inclusion serves merely to lessen the effects of Tiebout bias.
The strongest determinant of the demand for public schooling is the proportion of community residents who do not have a high school diploma. Even so, the -.56 elasticity shows that demand is not very responsive to changes in community education level. The proportion of community residents who have only a high school diploma is not significantly related to public school quality demand. On the other hand, median community income is a positive demand shifter; the income elasticity of demand is .32, which is larger than the income elasticities reported in RSR but smaller than the .38 to .83 range found by Brasington / THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS 181 Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982) . The higher the proportion of single residents, the lower the demand for public schooling, all else constant. The elasticity is -.22. This study includes both the tax price and the implicit price of schooling; other studies use one or the other. It is instructive to reestimate demand including only one price at a time to see how the results change. The results of these experiments are shown in the No Tax and No Price columns in Table 4 . Removing the tax price makes the implicit price elasticity of demand go from -.11 to -.12, and it makes the income elasticity of demand go from .32 to .30. Removing the implicit price of schooling makes the tax price elasticity go from -.17 to -.20, and it makes the income elasticity of demand go from .32 to .28.
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PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW Using one price measure at a time does not change parameter estimates very much. It therefore seems that including both the implicit price and the tax price in the demand regression is a legitimate procedure that provides more information than including only one price measure.
The final column in Table 4 investigates the role of the RSR sorting variables. RSR said that including sorting variables mitigates Tiebout bias and gives a more accurate estimate of the income elasticity of demand. The last column of Table 4 shows how the regression results change when the RSR sorting variables are removed. The resultant income elasticity of demand is identical to that of the baseline regression: .32. One may speculate that (1) there is no Tiebout bias in the current sample, (2) Tiebout bias exists but does not affect the regression results in the current sample, or (3) RSR's sorting variables do not effectively address Tiebout bias in the current sample. The existence of Tiebout bias is not the focus of this study; the experiment is mentioned in passing to spark further investigation.
CONCLUSION
This study estimates the demand for public schooling, a local public good of considerable importance. It also investigates the relationship between public school quality and house prices.
The study supports the following findings. School quality is positively related to constant-quality house price. The mean elasticity of house price with respect to public school quality is .21. The elasticity may seem small, but house price is more responsive to changes in school quality than to changes in any other community variable. The prominence of school quality's relationship with house price confirms previous research (Goodman and Thibodeau 1998; Haurin and Brasington 1996) . The parameter estimates of public school quality in the hedonic regressions are used to calculate the implicit price of public schooling. The implicit price is used to estimate the demand for public schooling.
Quantity demanded is a function of price. Unlike prior studies, the current demand study measures the price of schooling by both the implicit price calculated from the hedonic and the tax price. ExperimenBrasington / THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODStation shows that including both price measures in the demand estimation simultaneously does not change the parameter estimates achieved when only one price measure is included. The implicit price and the tax price seem to be legitimate and distinct measures of the price of public schooling. The price elasticity of demand is -.11, and the tax price elasticity of demand is -.17. The elasticities are slightly more inelastic than those reported in previous demand for public school quality regressions.
The income elasticity of demand for schooling is .32. The strongest determinant of demand is the proportion of community residents who have no high school diploma; its elasticity is -.56. A large proportion of single residents also seems negatively related to public school quality demand. The current study addresses Tiebout bias in the manner that RSR suggested, but the inclusion of the sorting variables does not affect the regression results.
A relevant policy implication is suggested by the -.11 and -.17 price elasticities. The demand curve is relatively inelastic. Attempts to improve public school quality by shifting the supply of schooling to the right may be hindered by the relatively inelastic demand curve: For a given change in supply, an inelastic demand curve makes the equilibrium change in the quantity of public schooling relatively small. It may take great effort to generate a small increase in public school quality because of the shape of the demand curve.
NOTES
4. It is possible to argue that identification cannot be achieved from only six hedonic estimations. However, Palmquist (1984) used only six hedonics, and Witte, Sumka, and Erekson (1979) used only four. In addition, this argument is only valid if there is little variation in the marginal prices among the hedonics. And in fact, only two markets are needed to identify the demand equation from the house price hedonics (Hite 1995) .
5. It is not necessary to include the LOT SIZE interaction, but following Haurin and Brasington (1996) , heteroskedasticity is suspected, and its form is assumed to be proportional to the size of the lot.
6. For example, compare Marquis (1996) to Hanushek and Taylor (1990) to Brasington (1999) .
7. Specifically, the passage rates for the reading, writing, math, and citizenship sections are added up, and the resulting sum is divided by four.
8. Only if a student's team leader determines that the student has a learning disability each year and exempts that student every year of his or her high school career will that student not be required to take the proficiency test.
9. Thanks to the following econometricians for their unanimous opinion on this issue: Erdal Tekin, Muktar Ali, Murat Munkin, Stephen Cosslett, and Hag-Soo Kim.
10. ACCRA (1991 ACCRA ( , 1992 provided the data from which MSA deflators were constructed and all nominal values were deflated, including housing transaction prices.
11. To help confirm that there is sufficient variation, a pooled regression is estimated including the interaction between school quality and an MSA dummy, with Cleveland as the omitted dummy, to see how many of the interaction dummies are significant. All five are significant; T values are as follows: Akron, 30.8; Cincinnati, 4.0; Columbus, 21.6; Dayton, 20.0; Toledo, 31.5 . This supports the notion of sufficient variation. In addition, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates are the same across MSAs. The calculated F statistic of 380.3 exceeds the critical value of 3.02 at the .01 level.
12. Brasington (2000 Brasington ( , 2001 used proficiency test scores to measure the supply of school quality.
